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1 Introduction
One of the most puzzling results in nancial economics is why fund managers invest
in short-maturity assets even though they could obtain larger prots in assets with
longer maturity.1 This puzzle may become particularly important as long as the large
recurrence of this phenomenon may eventually a¤ect the equilibrium prices in nancial
markets. In this paper, we propose an explanation for this puzzling behavior based
mainly upon two facts. First, during the last decades institutional investors have in-
creased dramatically their participation in the nancial system.2 Consequently, it is
reasonable to conjecture that labor contracts signed by this class of investors and their
managers may play an important role as determinants of the stock pricesdynamics.
Second, there is a recent evidence supporting the fact that young managers exhibit a
clear bias in favor of short-maturity securities. This suggests the usefulness of con-
sidering a theoretical framework in which decisions on investment maturity may be
driven by an age-based agent heterogeneity.
We combine these two facts in a career concern-based model in which the institu-
tional investor (the principal) designs an optimal contract that considers both explicit
and implicit incentives of two class of funds managers (the agents): young and old
traders. While the former is a trader who cares about how the current performance
a¤ect his future compensation, the latter is a trader without career concerns. The
major prediction of our model is that, under certain conditions, this optimal contract
leads the young (old) managers to prefer short-maturity (long-maturity) investments.
Under the career concerns set-up, the intuition behind this result is quite simple. Since
the history of old tradersperformance have already been revealed, the principals pre-
diction about their ability is better than that made when they are young. This implies
that a young trader has to show good returns in the short-run in order to improve the
principals belief about his ability, and to increase both the probability of being retained
and his future compensation. As a consequence, he ends up selecting short-maturity
assets less protable than the long-maturity ones.
The main implication of our model is that this investment maturity bias may even-
tually explain some episodes of stock price overreactions observed in practice.3 This
means therefore that our setting is able to shed light on a very relevant nancial puz-
zle by characterizing an interesting and so far unexplored link between both the labor
market and the nancial market.
1See Chevalier and Ellison (1999).
2For instance, in the New York Stock Exchange, the percentage of outstanding corporate equity
held by institutional investors has increased from 7,2% in 1950 to 49,8% in 2002 (NYSE Factbook
2003).
3See Dasgupta and Prat (2005).
Career Concerns and Investment Maturity in Mutual Funds 3
Furthermore, we extend our model by performing a sensibility analysis of the results
when we include both career-risk concerns - how the agents current performance
a¤ects the variability of his future compensation - and multitask analysis. Under
the assumption that implicit incentives are strong and the presence of an information
collection e¤ort, we observe that both young and old managers prefer to invest in long-
maturity assets. In addition, both kind of traders choose the same contract when the
ratio of variances of long-maturity to short-maturity assets increases. The intuition
of this result is that the higher the career-risk concerns, the smaller the information
collection e¤ort level. As a consequence, the mutual funds owner may nd optimal
to increase the managers pay-for-performance sensitivity, leading young managers to
adopt bolder positions in favor of securities with long maturity.
Our work is in connection with plenty of literature, both theoretical and applied
one. For instance, one of the works that supports empirically the fund managers
preferences for short-maturity positions is that of Chevalier and Ellison (1999). They
nd that young fund managers are more risk averse in selecting their portfolios -
by choosing short-maturity securities - than the old ones, even though in this way,
they obtain less prots by comparison with what they could get holding more mature
assets. Furthermore, their results suggest a nonlinear relationship between managerial
turnover and mutual funds performance. This means that for young traders the
managerial turnover is more performance-sensitive than the old ones, which leads to
a U-shape in the relationship between managerial turnover and traders performance.
Chevalier and Ellison explain this fact through the di¤erences in the career concerns
among them. In this way, as well as Dutta and Reichelsen (2003) and Sabac (2006),
our work tries to explain theoretically this empirical evidence through the di¤erences
in the pay-for-performance sensitivity between young and old managers.
A large literature in economics and nance have studied the determinants of the
executive compensation contracts. Nevertheless, only a minority part has focused on
how the implicit incentives of the fund managers a¤ect the design of these contracts,
and through this, the investment maturity decisions. The exceptions are Gibbons and
Murphy (1992), Meyer and Vickers (1997), Dutta and Reichelsen (2003), Christensen
et al. (2005) and Sabac (2006). All of these works study how optimal contracts includ-
ing managers career concerns can explain the aforementioned nonlinear managerial
turnover-performance relationship for young and old managers. In general, this litera-
ture analyzes dynamic settings with short-term contracts based on the career concerns
model developed by Holmström (1999). For instance, Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
assume that the principals bargaining power is null, i.e. that the principals expected
surplus is zero in equilibrium. On the contrary, Meyer and Vickers (1997) develop a
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model in which the bargaining power is on the principals hands, i.e. in equilibrium
the agents certainty equivalent is zero at each contracting date. Another di¤erence
between both works is that while the former shows the equivalence between short-term
contracts and renegotiation-proof contracts, the latter proves that the agents e¤ort in
equilibrium and the total surplus are independent of the bargaining power. Trying to
encompass these models, Sabac (2006) characterizes the optimal short-term contract
which satises renegotiation-proof including long-term actions, when today actions af-
fect not only today but also tomorrow performance. Unlike all this literature, we
attempt to explain how the fund managers investment maturity decisions are deter-
mined by the design of the optimal labor contracts regarding both short and long-term
actions.
Finally, our paper is also related to some corporate nance literature. In partic-
ular, Von Thadden (1995) constructs a dynamic model with asymmetric information
between risk neutral investors and rms. Under his framework, it makes impossible
to implement long-term projects which are more protable. This work then tries to
explain why some myopic lenders could induce their borrowers - an entrepreneur rm -
to invest in short-term projects. However, unlike our setting, Von Thadden takes only
into account the risk-neutral agents explicit incentives but not his implicit incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a career concern model that
includes investment maturity decisions in the context of an institutional investor, and
characterizes the optimal contract. Section 3 presents a numerical analysis that shows
situations in which fund managers with (without) career concern prefer assets with
short (long) maturity. In the next section, we examine the robustness of these results
when including human capital risk and multitask analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes
and discusses other possible extensions.
2 The Model
The output performance process
Consider an agency model in which the principal is the mutual funds owner and
the agent corresponds to the trader, who for simplicity we assume that is the mutual
fund manager as well. The trader works for two periods. At the begining of period 1,
the trader selects his investment portfolio. That is, he invests an amount of money I.
At each period t, the output performance of this process corresponds to the variation
of the value of such an investments (i.e.the return) denoted by zt. This is given by
an additive formulation of the traders ability (), the traders non-negative e¤ort (at)
Career Concerns and Investment Maturity in Mutual Funds 5
and a noise (Ht ), as follows
zt  4It =  + at + Ht ; (2.1)
where  is normally distributed with mean m0 and variance 20.
Similarly, we assume that the noise Ht is normally distributed with mean Ht and
variance 2
H
. The index H denotes the horizon of the investment so that H = S
(= L) means that the trader selects short-maturity (long-maturity) securities. Thus,
the agent decides not only the e¤ort level, but also the horizon of his investment.
Following Von Thadden (1995), we assume that the short-maturity investment gives
more benets in the rst-period than the long-maturity one. However, regarding the
total gains for the two periods, long-maturity assets are more protable than short-
maturity ones. Moreover, we suppose that the long-maturity investment is more risky
than the short-term one. These ideas are formalized by means of the next assumptions:
(A1) S1 > L1 ,
(A2) S2 < L2 ,
(A3) S1 + S2 < L1 + L2 , and
(A4) 2
S
< 2
L
,
where  2 (0; 1) represents a discount factor.
In addition, we adopt some standard assumptions in the career concerns literature.
First, independence both among Ht s, and with ability ; is supposed to be hold.
Second, we assume that the true ability of the trader is unknown even for himself.
As a consequence, the principal adjusts her beliefs on the mean and the variance of
this ability based only upon the information revealed through the investment returns
observed in the previous period.
The payo¤ functions
The trader is risk-averse with the following exponential utility function:
U(w1; w2; a1; a2) =   exp( r
(
2X
t=1
t 1 [wt   g(at)]
)
)
where wt is the agents wage, g(:) measures the disutility of e¤ort and r corresponds to
the absolute risk-aversion index. We assume that g(:) is convex and satises g0(0) = 0;
g0(1) =1 and g000  0.
We consider two kind of agents: young traders and old traders, While the former
have career concerns, the latter do not care about their future careers.
The funds owner is risk-neutral with a prot function given by4
(z1; z2;w1; w2) =
2X
t=1
t 1 (zt   wt) :
4We normalize the price of output to unity.
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Type of Employment Contracts
We assume throughout the paper that all employment contracts o¤ered by funds
owners to traders correspond to linear contracts of the form wt(zt) = ct + btzt. On
the one side, ct, the xed part, represents the insurance wage since traders are risk-
averse. On the other side, bt, the variable component, is called the pay-for-performance
sensitivity.
Within this linear formulation, we specify two di¤erent types of labor contracts:
contingent and non-contingent contracts, as follows.
(1) Contingent contract with termination after bad news (CC). This arrangement
consists of two one-period labor contracts, one for each period. However, if the rst-
period results are less than certain threshold z, the whole contract nishes and is not
renewed to the second period.5 In this sense, it is a contingent contract because the
second-period contract is exerted only under the condition z1 > z . According to this
contract, the trader can only select short-maturity assets.
(2) Non-contingent contract with continuation after bad news (NC). This is a two-
period labor contract in which no matter what happens to the rst-period output. In
this sense, it is non-contingent because the continuation of the contract to the second-
period does not depend on the rst-period results. According to this contract, the
trader can only select long-maturity assets.6
Therefore, each labor contract allows the trader to invest in assets with di¤erent
maturity. Thus, the risk-expected return proles associated to contingent and non-
contingent contracts di¤er. One motivation for this assumption comes from the fact
that employment arrangements very similar to these two kind of contracts are observed
in the real world. This is the case of institutional investors which must o¤er di¤erent
labor contracts to its traders because they face customers with di¤erent risk-return
proles and investment horizons. Thus, while some investors looks for high returns in
the short-term (who put their savings in hedge funds, money management companies,
and aggressive mutual funds), others are willing to wait for larger gains in the long-term
(who put their savings in insurance companies, pension fund companies, and private
equity rms).
Timing of the contracting game
We assume that all the bargaining power is on agents hands. The timing of this
game depends on the type of labor contract chosen by the trader (and thereby, on the
horizon investment selected by him).
5For instance, z could be equal zero. Thus, after bad results, the contract is not renegotiated.
6Gibbons and Murphy (1992) demonstrate a renegotiation proof for this kind of contracts. First,
they characterize a two short-term labor contracts. Then, they construct an optimal long-term labor
contract o¤ering a di¤erent explicit incentives in each period.
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In the case of contingent labor contracts, the timing is as follows. At the beginning
of the rst period, prospective employers simultaneously o¤er the trader single-period
linear wage contracts w1(z1) as dened before and he chooses the most attractive one.
The trader selects a short-maturity asset and exerts a level of e¤ort. At the end of
the rst period, the rst-period wage is paid. At the same time, the principal and the
market observe the output z1. At the beginning of period 2, if they observe good
results (z1 > z), they simultaneously o¤er the trader another single-period linear wage
contract w2(z2). After that, the trader exerts a new level of e¤ort. At the end of the
second period, investment returns are known, wages are paid, and the game is over. In
contrast, if bad news on the rst-period result are revealed (z1 < z), no new contract
for the second-period is o¤ered to him by any principal.
In the case of non-contingent labor contracts, the timing is very similar with two
exceptions. First, the trader selects instead a long-maturity asset. Second, the second-
period contract w2(z2) is always o¤ered no matter what happens to the investment
return in the previous period.
Characterization of the Optimal Contract
Given the compensation contracts described above, the traders expected utility is
a function of the rst and second period e¤ort as follows
 E fexp( r [c1 + b1z1   g(a1)]  r [c2(z1) + b2z2   g(a2)])g : (2.2)
In order to solve this problem, consider the Subperfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
concept. Consequently, we apply backward induction so that we begin characterizing
the second-period e¤ort problem.
Second-period contract. The characterization of the second-period contract
assumes implicitly that the second-period result is larger than the threshold z in the
case of the contingent contract. From the perspective of the second-period trader, after
the rst-period e¤ort a1 and the horizon investment H have been chosen, and z1 has
been observed, his e¤ort choice problem is given by
max
a2
 E fexp( r [c2 + b2z2   g(a2)])jz1g : (2.3)
Hence, a2(b2), the optimal second-period agents e¤ort choice satises
g0(a2) = b2 (2.4)
Note that we assume that all the bargaining power is on the agents hands. As a
consequence, competition among prospective second-period employers implies that the
contract the trader accepts for the second period must generate zero expected prots.
Therefore, the principals zero prot condition at period 2 is given by
2 = E fz2jz1g   [c2(z1; b2) + b2E fz2jz1g] = 0: (2.5)
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Hence, and according to (2.1), the optimal xed part of the second-period wage can
be obtained using the following condition:
c2(z1; b2) = (1  b2)E fz2jz1g
= (1  b2)
h
E fjz1g+ a2(b2) + H2
i
(2.6)
Using De Groot (1970), it can be stated that the conditional distribution of  given
the observed rst-period output z1 is Normal with mean
E fjz1g  m1(z1;a^1) =
2
H
(m0 + H1
) + 20(z1   a^1)
20 + 
2
H
(2.7)
and variance
V fjz1g  21 =
20
2
H
20 + 
2
H
; (2.8)
where a^1 represents the markets conjecture about the rst-period e¤ort. Let 2
H
z2jz1 
21+ 
2
H
, the conditional variance of + H2 given the observed rst-period output z1.
Applying the rst-order approach, we can substitute (2.4) and (2.6) into (2.3) to
restate the e¤ort choice problem. Accordingly, for an arbitrary b2 and given the rst-
period output z1, (2.3) can be rewritten as:
max
b2
 E fexp( r [c2(z1; b2) + b2z2   g(a2(b2))])jz1g :
Using (2.7) and (2.8), this problem becomes
max
b2
m1(z1; a^1) + a

2(b2) + H2
  g(a2(b2))  1=2r
h
b22
2H
2
i
:
Now, using the rst order conditions of this optimization problem, we get the following
expression for b2:
bC2 =
1h
1 + r2
H
z2jz1g
00(a2)
i ; (2.9)
where C = NC and CC. Note from (2.9) that the second-period explicit incentives
depend on the conditional variance of the second-period output 2
H
z2jz1 : This means that
the pay for performance is sensitive to the type of employment contract, and thereby,
to the horizon investment.
First-period contract. Now, we analyze separately contingent and non-
contingent labor arrangements. We start nding out what is the optimal contract
in the rst case. Given the optimal second-period contract derived above, the traders
incentive problem at the rst-period is to choose a1 to maximize:
 E fexp( r [c1 + b1z1   g(a1)]  r [c2(z1; b2) + b2z2   g(a2(b2))])g : (2.10)
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From the rst-order condition of this problem, we obtain
g0(a1) = b1 + 
@c2(z1; b

2)
@a1
 B1: (2.11)
So far, we have taken a^1 as given. Thus, the last expression characterizes implicitely the
traders best response to the markets second-period conjecture about the rst-period
e¤ort, a^1. Since equation (2.11) does not depend on a^1, in equilibrium the markets
conjecture coincides with the optimal rst period e¤ort. Therefore, the equilibrium
conjecture is
a^1 = a

1(b1):
As was established before, the principals expected prot must be zero in each period.
Hence, we have that
c1(b1) = (1  b1)E fz1g
= (1  b1)(m0 + a1(b1) + H1 ) (2.12)
Notice that the terms inside the two exponential functions of expression (2.10) cor-
respond to variables normally distributed. Thus, we can apply the property of the
log-normal random variables.7 Then, substituting a1(b1) and c1(b1) into (2.10) yields
the rst-period traders expected utility for an arbitrary b1:
  exp ( r z1   g(a1(b1)) r z2   g(a2(b2)) 12r2 h(B1 + b2)22Hz1   2B1b22Hi )
with z1 = E(z1); z2 = E(z2) and 
2H
z1 = V (z1). The rst-order condition of this
problem with respect to b1 gives us the following expression:
bC1 =
1
1 + r
P2H
z1
g00(a1(b1))| {z }
Noise reduction e¤ ect
  (1  b2)
20
20 + 
2H
| {z }
Career concern e¤ ect
  rb

2
2
0g
00(a1(b1))
1 + r
P2H
z1
g00(a1(b1))| {z }
Career risk e¤ ect
(2.13)
where C = NC;CC.
We observe three class of e¤ects on the pay-for-performance component: (i) a noise
reduction e¤ect, (ii) a career concerns e¤ect, and (iii) a career risk e¤ect. The noise re-
duction e¤ect means that the higher the conditional variance of output, the smaller the
variable compensation. In other words, the trader prefers less noise in the investment
process. The career concerns e¤ect reects the substitutability between explicit and
implicit incentives. Thus, the higher the career concern-based incentives measured by
the second term of the r.h.s. of equation (2.13), the smaller the pay-for performance.
7These terms are essentially linear combinations of z1; and z2, which are normally distributed.
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Lastly, the career risk e¤ect formalizes the idea that a risk-averse trader wants to be
compensated for high variances in his performance due to low realizations of ability.
It is worthy to note how di¤erences in labor contracts, and so di¤erences in
investment horizons, a¤ect this substitutability between explicit and implicit incen-
tives. Therefore, we observe di¤erent linear wages depending on contingency or non-
contingency of employment contracts, and thereby, on the maturity (long vs. short) of
the assets.8
The relevance of the risk aversion assumption can be stated from the following
simple analysis. It is easy to verify from (2.13) that under risk neutrality (r = 0), the
rst-period explicit incentives of both contingent and non-contingent labor contracts
becomes
b
C
1 = 1 
"


1  bC2
 20
20 + 
2
H
!#
:
Since now from (2.9) bC2 = 1, it follows that b
C
1 = 1 for C = CC;NC. Therefore,
this illustrates that in order to explain how the presence of these two class of contracts
a¤ects the trader´s investment horizon decision, one must assume risk aversion.
Old Traders Optimal Contracts
As was mentioned before, while the young agents cares about their future career,
the old ones has no such reputational concerns. We formalize this di¤erence in our
setup by assuming that ability of the old trader has already been fully revealed, and
thus, its variance 20 is equal to zero. As a result, it yields the following optimal explicit
incentives for old traders at the second-period
bC2 =
1h
1 + r2
H
g00(a2)
i ;
and at the rst-period
bC1 =
1
1 + r2
H
g00(a1(b1))
for C = CC;NC: The last expression shows clearly that optimal contracts for old
traders only exhibit a noise reduction e¤ect, but neither career concern nor risk career
e¤ect come to play a role. The absence of reputational concerns then implies that all
incentives are driven by the pay for performance component, and no substitutability
between explicit and implicit incentives emerges.
8 In the next section we endogeneize the career-risk concern (or human capital risk concerns), which
also a¤ects this substitutability.
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3 Investment Maturity Decision: Numerical Results
The main purpose of this paper is to characterize conditions under which traders
(young and old) prefer to invest in either long or short maturity assets. To this end,
we perform a comparison in terms of the surplus obtained by these agents from the two
class of labor contracts analized in our setting: non-contingent (NC) and contingent
(CC) contracts.
Let SCY and S
C
O be the surplus obtained from the labor contract C by young and old
traders, respectively. Also, let us dene surplus di¤erencesDY andDO asDY = SCCY  
SNCY andDO = S
CC
O   SNCO , respectively. A positive surplus di¤erence evaluated at the
optimal contract then indicates that a trader (young or old) prefers to sign a contingent
employment contract instead of a non-contingent one. Equivalently, this means that
he also prefers to invest in a short-maturity assets instead of a long-maturity ones.
In order to assess the traders surplus from both labor contracts, one need to choose
realistic numerical values for all model parameters. Ravin (2000) developed a set
of parameter values that approximates decisions that resemble real-world investment
choices by assuming a CARA utility function. The specic parameter values employed
are the following.
First, we assume the following preference parameters: a risk aversion parameter
r = :05 and a discount factor  = :9. Second, our analysis has shown that optimal
contracts (and so traders surplus di¤erences) depend crucially on both expected return
and riskiness of investments - for both long and short maturity ones -. Based upon
U.S. historical data, we suppose that the long-maturity asset is normally distributed
with mean return 6.4% and standard deviation 10%.9 In contrast, we assume that the
short-maturity asset follows a normal distribution with mean return 0.5% and standard
deviation of 0.3%.
Given these parameters, we construct the variance ratio KV as follows
KV =
2
L
2
S
;
and KM , the following mean return ratio
KM =
L1
+ L2
S1
+ S2
:
Since the bargaining power is on agents hands, the trader surplus is the expected
CARA utility function evaluated at the optimal contract characterized in the previous
section. Table 1 shows the e¤ects of both the variance ratio and the mean return ratio
on surplus di¤erences of old and young traders.
9Ravin (2000) works with a standard deviation of 20%. Our assumption is thus more conservative.
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case KM = 12 KM = 13 KM = 14
KV = 20 DY = 0.00135 DY = 0.00110 DY = 0.00085
DO = -0.00007 DO = -0.00031 DO = -0.00055
KV = 40 DY = 0.00189 DY = 0.00165 DY = 0.00140
DO = -0.00090 DO = -0.00112 DO = -0.00136
KV = 60 DY = 0.00234 DY = 0.00209 DY = 0.00184
DO = -0.00169 DO = -0.00233 DO = -0.00216
KM = ratio between long-maturity and short-maturity expected return.
KV = ratio between long-maturity and short-maturity variance.
DY=Young manager's surplus difference.
DO=Old manager's surplus difference.
TABLE 1
Surplus difference between non-contingent and contingent labor contract
We observe that under a variance ratio su¢ ciently high (KV  20), young traders
prefer a contingent labor contract instead of a non-contingent one. This result follows
from the substitutability between explicit and implicit incentives in our model. Then,
the higher the career concerns they face, the smaller the non-contingent labor contract
explicit incentives. This implies that they are more conservative in their investments,
and thereby, choose short-maturity assets.
Moreover, the higher the long-maturity asset variance, the higher the preference
by young traders for contingent labor contracts, and so, for short-maturity assets.
Since managers concern about his future job opportunities, they care about career-risk
concerns. This last e¤ect implies less non-contingent explicit incentives again. Thus,
the higher the preference to invest in less risky assets.
On the contrary, since old traders do not have career concerns, they only care about
explicit incentives. Thus, there is no substitutability between explicit and implicit
incentives. As a result, they hold riskier assets. Furthermore, the higher the long-
maturity asset variance - the higher KV -, the higher the preference for non-contingent
labor contracts, and thus, for long-maturity assets.
It is important to note that these numerical results account for one of the main
stylized facts described by Chevalier and Ellison (1999) for the U.S. mutual fund mar-
ket. In fact, they present evidence that suggests that old managers prefer assets with
longer maturity than those assets selected by the young ones. Interestingly, Chevalier
and Ellison also attributes these di¤erences in investment maturity to reputational
concerns.
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4 Extensions
4.1 Including Human Capital Risk
In the previous section we take into account reputation concerns, i.e. how the managers
current performance a¤ects the level of his future compensation. However, the agents
current performance can also a¤ect the variability of his prospective compensation,
what we call career-risk concerns or human capital risk.10 To study this e¤ect, in
this section we introduce two innovations to the baseline model: (i) di¤erent degrees
of career concern, and (ii) an additional class of e¤ort called information e¤ort.
The main implication of this extension is that we can observe complementarity be-
tween implicit and explicit incentives instead of substitutability as we have seen before.
Following Chen and Jiang (2008), we introduce a multitask analysis and generalize the
last career concern setup. A numerical analysis points out that now both old and young
fund managers prefer to invest assets with long maturity.
4.1.1 Degree of Career Concerns
In order to implement this extension, we introduce a correlation in the ability process.
Now, the ability or productivity measure follows a normal stationary autoregressive
process with one lag, i.e., AR(1). In this way, t is correlated over time through the
next system:
1 = 
2 =  +
p
1  2:
As in previous section, we assume both the principal and the agent share the com-
mon prior that  is normal distributed with variance . For simplicity, we assume
throughout this section that E () = m0 = 0. Further,  is a zero mean gaussian nor-
mal process independent of , with variance equal to . Therefore, 1 and 2 have
the same unconditional variance equal to 2.
Notice that  plays an important role in this process because when  = 1, we
are in the baseline model in which career concerns are maximum. In addition, 
captures the degree of persistence of the agents career concerns since a higher  implies
higher sensitivity of the agents future compensation to current-period performance.
Furthermore, when we model the second period as a reduced-form representation of
all future periods, the career concerns parameter, , captures the tenure e¤ect. The
smaller the expected tenure implies the lower correlation between the agents ability
10See Mukherjee (2005) and Chen and Jiang (2004).
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and the rms future productivity. Then, by introducing  2 [0; 1] we analyze the
relationship between explicit incentives and the degree of the agents career concerns.
4.1.2 Multitask and Career-Risk Concerns
Following Chen and Jiang (2004), we introduce a new class of e¤ort: information
collection e¤ort, e 2 [0; 1]. In this way, the trader can exert another type of e¤ort
in order to produce a publicly veriable report, r, about his ability . There exists
some linear relationship between the report and the ability: r = 1 + , where  is
a zero mean normal innovation term orthogonal to 1 with variance
(1 e)
e . This
variance implies that the higher information collection e¤ort, the higher the precision
of the report to forecast 1. We assume that the principal only uses the report r for
contracting goals.
As in our baseline model, we assume that the contract takes the linear form wt =
ct+btzt+tr where ct; bt and t are constants. Notice that we introduce r as a variable
that can help the principal to forecast the next period ability. In this way, the wage
system can be rewritten as:
w1 = c1 + b1z1 + 1r
w2 = c2(r; z1) + b2z2
We assume that e is not contractible, i.e. it is chosen by the agent after the contract is
o¤ered to him and is non-veriable. The timeline of this game is described by Figure
1.
t=0 0<t<1 t=1 1<t<2 t=2
Principal offers a wage
payment contingent on
z1 and r.
Agent chooses both
a1 and e.
First-period contract is
executed and z1 and r are
observed.  Second-period
contract is signed.
Agent chooses a2.
Second-period contract is
executed and z2 is
observed.
In order to solve the model, we consider again the Subperfect-Nash equilibrium concept.
Then, using backward induction, at the beginning of the second-period, z1 and r are
observed. Afterwards, the trader chooses a1 and e. Finally, the principal chooses c2
and b2 to maximize the expected prot subject to the agents participation and the
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incentive compatibility constraint. Then, the second period e¤ort choice problem is:
max
a2
 E fexp r (w2   g(a2)) jr; z1g :
Thus, a2(b2) satises g0(a2) = b2. As in the previous section, normalizing the price of
output to unity and using zero prot condition, we obtain:
c2(z1; r; b2) = (1  b2)E fz2 j z1; rg
= (1  b2)
h
E f j z1; rg+ a2(b2) + H2
i
; (4.1)
with
E(jz1; r)  m1(z1; r; a^1)
=
(1  e)20(z1   a1) + e2Hr + (1  e)2HH1
(1  e)20 + 2H
(4.2)
and variance
V (jz1; r)  21
=
(1  e)202H
(1  e)20 + 2H
: (4.3)
In this way, we observe how the reputation concerns, , and career-risk concerns, e,
a¤ect the agents xed wage in the second period. Now, replacing c2(z1; b2) and a2(b2)
in the agents maximization problem, we obtain
b2 =
1h
1 + r2
H
2 g
00(a2)
i ; (4.4)
with 2
H
2 = 
2
1 + 
2
H
. We observe a positive implicit relationship between informa-
tion collection e¤ort and second-period explicit incentives through total conditional
variance.
Given the optimal second-period contract derived above, the traders rst-period
incentive problem is to choose a1 to maximize the following problem:
 E fexp( r [c1 + b1z1 + 1r   g(a1)]  r [c2(z1; b2) + b2z2   g(a2(b2))])g :
Then, we get
g0(a1) = b1 + 
@c2(z1; b2)
@a1
= b1 + 
(
(1  b2)
"
(1  e)20
(1  e)20 + 2H
#)
 B1: (4.5)
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So far we have taken a^1 as given. Thus, the last expression characterizes the workers
best response to the markets second-period conjecture about rst-period e¤ort, a^1.
Since equation (4.5) does not depend on a^1, in equilibrium, the markets conjecture
coincides with the optimal rst period e¤ort.
Therefore, the equilibrium conjecture is:
a^1 = a

1(b1):
As we established before, the fund owners expected prots must be zero in each period.
Hence, assuming a0 = 0,
c1(b1) = (1  b1)E fz1g
= (1  b1)

m0 + a

1(b1) + 
H
1

+ 1E(r): (4.6)
Since E(r) = 0, we then obtain the same expression as our baseline model.
Substituting a1(b1) and c1(b1) in the rst-period maximization problem yields the
following rst-period expected utility for an arbitrary b1:
  exp (  r m0 + a1(b1) + H1   g(a1(b1))  r m0 + a2(b2) + a1 + H2 )  g(a2(b2))
  (1=2)r2
"
(B1 + b

2)
22
H
1   2B1b22H + (+ b2)220 + 2

(1  e)
e
2
2
H
  2b2220
#
)
with 2
H
1 = 
2
0 + 
2
H
.
From the rst order condition with respect to b1 we get
b
C
1 =
1
1 + r2
H
1 g
00(a1(b1))
 

1  bC2
 (1  e)20
(1  e)20 + 2H
  rb
C
2 
2
0g
00(a1(b1))
1 + r2
H
1 g
00(a1(b1))
(4.7)
with C = CC, NC.
4.2 Numerical Analysis
To assess the traders surplus from contingent and non-contingent labor contracts, we
need to choose realistic numerical values for all model parameters. We assume  and
 equals to 0.5.11 In order to observe a degree of substitutability between explicit
and implicit incentives, we assume an information e¤ort level e = :1. The rest of
parameters are the same as in our baseline model. The following table presents the
surplus di¤erence between both class of contracts for traders with and wihout career
concerns:
11When we only consider di¤erent levels of career concerns, we obtain the same results as in our
baseline model. This means that our previous analysis is robust to intertemporal correlations in the
ability process. Only when we include Chen and Jiangs modications about di¤erent kind of e¤ort -
multitask analysis - we observe changes in our baseline model results.
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case KM = 12 KM = 13 KM = 14
KV = 20 DY = -0,11061 DY = -0,11083 DY = -0,11106
DO = -0,00801 DO = -0,00825 DO = -0,00849
KV = 40 DY = -0,11949 DY = -0,11972 DY = -0,11994
DO = -0,01624 DO = -0,01647 DO = -0,01671
KV = 60 DY = -0,12822 DY = -0,12844 DY = -0,12866
DO = -0,02439 DO = -0,02463 DO = -0,02486
KM = ratio between long-maturity and short-maturity expected return.
KV = ratio between long-maturity and short-maturity variance.
DY=Young manager's surplus difference.
DO=Old manager's surplus difference.
TABLE 2
Surplus difference between non-contingent and contingent labor contract
With degrees of career-concern and multitask analysis, we observe that both young
and old managers prefer to invest in long-maturity assets, as DO;DY < 0. More-
over, both types of traders behave in the same way when the variance ratio increases.
Thus, the higher the variance of long-maturity assets, the higher the preference to
non-contingent labor contracts. The intuition of this result is that the higher the
career-risk concerns, the smaller the information e¤ort level. As a consequence, the
mutual funds owner may nd optimal to increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity.
All of this implies that young managers become bolder as they also follow investment
strategies with long maturity.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper addresses an important puzzle in nancial economics: why fund managers
invest in short-maturity assets even though they could obtain more prots by holding
positions in securities with longer maturity. We provide an explanation to this phe-
nomenon based on the labor contracts signed between institutional investors and their
traders.
In particular, we examine how di¤erences in the pay-for-performances sensitivity
of young and old traders a¤ect their investment horizon decisions when career concerns
are considered. In our framework, only young traders care about their career concerns.
By analyzing the substitutability between explicit and implicit incentives contained
in the optimal labor contracts, we then perform a numerical analysis showing that
young (old) managers prefer short-maturity (long-maturity) positions. The higher
the career concerns they face, the smaller the non-contingent labor contract explicit
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incentives. This implies they are not bold in their investments, and thus, they choose
short-maturity assets.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Since the history of old traders
performance have already been revealed, the principals prediction about their ability
is better than that made on the young ones. As a consequence, young traders prefer
contingent labor contracts that implicitly lead them to select assets with a higher
mean return in the short run. This allows young traders to improve the principals
belief about his ability, and thus, increase both the chances of being retained and
his second-period compensation. However, as short-maturity assets exhibit lower mean
return than long-maturity ones in the long run, we eventually have a situation in which
less protable assets are selected. Interestingly, this prediction is consistent with the
recent evidence found by empirical literature focused on the U.S. mutual fund market
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1999).
Furthermore, we extend our model by performing a sensibility analysis of the results
when we include both career-risk concerns - how the agents current performance
a¤ects the variability of his future compensation - and multitask analysis. A numerical
analysis suggests that traders with and without career concerns prefer a non-contingent
labor contract. The intuition of this result is that the higher the career-risk concerns,
the smaller the information e¤ort level. Then, the mutual funds owner may nd
optimal to increase the managers pay-for-performance sensitivity. As a result, young
managers become eventually bolder in their investment strategies.
Some extensions of this work may take into account other aspects of the optimal
contracts: switching costs when traders decide to change the job; other kind of remu-
nerations in order to know more about the traders ability, for instante, stock options;
and so on. Furthermore, it should be considered other classes of performance process
which also imply di¤erences in the pay-for-performance sensitivity between young and
old managers. For instance, the variation of investments could follow a long memory
process instead of a normal stationary AR(1) process, which is more closed to the
empirical works in GDP time series.12
12Mayoral (2004) presents evidence that GNP per capita follows a long-memory process.
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